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ABSTRACT 
In response to the subprime mortgage crisis and increased regulatory protectionism, shadow banks 
have significantly increased market share in the mortgage origination market, originating over 50 
percent of conforming loans. This paper explores the effect of an inevitable interest rate increase 
on a potential deterioration in loan quality. Using 14.8 million loans from the Fannie Mae Single-
Family Loan Acquisition dataset, this study generates a scenario analysis of mortgage origination 
based on parallel yield curve shifts to better understand the strength of traditional and shadow 
banks and their ability to withstand the pressure of rising interest rate. A secondary analysis 
examines the loan performance under stress conditions similar to the recent financial crisis. The 
results demonstrate higher shadow bank sensitivity to interest rate changes and a higher risk 
premium for subprime mortgages among banks. The findings substantiate the strength of the 
conforming loan standards as safeguards to ensure minimum loan quality.  
 
Keywords: Mortgage, Shadow Bank, Bank, Regulation, Mortgage Origination  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The residential mortgage market underwent fundamental changes in the last decade. Janet Yellen 
and Ben Bernanke cite the loose mortgage lending standards and the subsequent significant losses 
in residential mortgage loans to subprime borrowers as “the most prominent triggers” of the 
recession (Bernanke 2010). The run and collapse of the subprime loan market and the increased 
regulatory protectionism revamped the landscape of the mortgage origination and underwriting 
market. The recent regulation was intended to promote safer lending standards among financial 
institutions, but it also promoted foundational changes to the market. Traditional banks have 
retreated from the market, with non-banks increasing market share, particularly in subprime loans.1 
The presence of shadow banks has filled an important gap by providing access to credit and 
homeownership to individuals. The significantly different business models and funding structures 
of traditional and shadow banks pose new risks and market vulnerabilities. The increasing interest 
rate environment will pressure the new market structure. Regulatory safeguards, such as the 
eligibility matrix for conforming loans, were established to prevent loan quality deterioration. 
However, limited historical precedent and research is available on the soundness and strength of 
the regulation and market structure.  
  
                                               
1 See Figure XI in the Appendix. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
2.1 Industry Structure 
Mortgage originators lend money to borrowers to facilitate the purchase of a new house or to 
refinance an existing home. The originators then possess a mortgage note that is entitled to a 
monthly interest and principle payments, with the home serving as collateral. The mortgage note 
can either be retained on the originator’s balance sheet or sold to a government-sponsored 
enterprise (GSE) or investor. The most prominent transaction is the sale to a GSE, such as Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, which purchase conforming loans that meet their guideline criteria and 
securitize a pool of these mortgages into a mortgage-backed security (MBS). The GSEs’ 
conforming loan standards are an eligibility matrix with different loan quality requirements based 
on the risk profile of the borrower. The GSEs then design a capital structure to tranch the MBS 
portfolio based on the priority of cash flows into collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs). 
These tranches are designed to target the credit rating and risk profile of investors. Investors then 
purchase a tranch of the CMO based on their appetite. GSEs provide an explicit guarantee against 
credit risk in all CMOs. Securitization enables the transfer of interest rate and credit risk, increases 
liquidity, increases fee income, and enhances capital ratios (Ambrose et al. 2005). Figure I 
illustrates the mortgage origination supply chain process. Many studies have examined the 
changing structure of the mortgage origination chain with a focus on the cost and benefits analysis 
(Purnanandam 2011, Keys et al., 2010 and 2013, Piskorski et al., 2010, Berndt and Gupta 2009). 
Figure I: Mortgage Origination Process 
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2.2 Industry History of Mortgage Origination 
2.2.1 Pre-crisis 
The mortgage origination market played a significant role in the escalation to the crisis. Innovative 
financing products, such as MBS and CMOs, offered higher interest rates than government 
securities, attractive risk rating from rating agencies, and limited exposure to default risk. The 
attractiveness of these products led to the increase in subprime mortgages and housing speculation 
(Agarwal et al., 2015 and 2017, Haughwout et al., 2016, Mayer et al., 2014).  
 
Many transferors in the series of mortgage ownership transfers required representation and 
warranty clauses from the next transferee by signing a mortgage loan purchase agreement. This 
clause is intended to prevent misrepresentation and instill accountability, but it proved to be 
ineffective. The perceived assurance of contractual representation and warranties within MBS led 
to overinvestment in this asset class (McCoy and Wachter 2016). 
 
Each entity along the mortgage origination supply chain earned unprecedented returns and 
transferred the risk along to the next entity on the chain. The exposure to mortgage risk was 
transferred along with the sale of the asset. In particular, most transfers from the originators were 
to special-purpose bankruptcy-remote entities, which granted maximal protection for the 
originators in the case of borrower delinquency. The risk exposure transfer led to an increase in 
origination volume (Ayotte and Gaon 2005). Lower quality subprime mortgages originated per 
year increased from historical averages of 8% to nearly 20% from 2004 to 2006 (Joint Center for 
Housing Studies of Harvard University).  
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Deterioration in loan quality was stimulated from both sides of the mortgage transaction. 
Originators would offer families adjustable rate mortgages (ARM) with low teaser monthly 
payments for the first few years that increase to a higher level, relying on the increase in housing 
prices to be able to re-finance the mortgage. This process enabled families with minimal income 
and cash to take out a loan with a high loan-to-value ratio, which would otherwise be non-
conforming because of the high interest rates. The percentage of subprime mortgages originated 
as ARMs increased to 81 in 2006 from 51 in 1999. For the Alt-A loans, a classification of 
mortgages between prime and subprime, 71% of the originations were ARMs compared with the 
6% over the same time period. The average combined loan-to-value ratio increased from 79% to 
86% (Ashcraft and Schuermann 2008).  
 
Many borrowers would also misrepresent themselves to earn more favorable conditions by lying 
about their income or manipulating their FICO scores. The Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network reported 53,000 cases of mortgage fraud in 2007, up from 3,500 in 2000 (Baily et al. 
2008). Many of these deceptive practices were non-issues once the borrowers were able to re-
finance and unlikely to default on the mortgage. The entire mortgage structure would continue as 
long as housing prices continued to rise. Trends of low lending standards and higher-risk mortgage 
innovation products increased personal indebtedness and risk vulnerability, leading to the collapse 
of the housing market. 
 
2.2.2 Financial Crisis 
Declining housing prices and sharp increases in delinquency rates disrupted the entire mortgage 
market. Delinquency rates spiked to over 10%, reducing investor appetite for MBS and CMOs and 
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causing a hold-up in the chain. Many earlier entities were unable to sell the risky mortgages to the 
next player to transfer the risk, exposing them to borrower default. In the case of delinquency, the 
owner of the mortgage gains possession of the home. However, the declining house prices and 
many underwater mortgages2 reduced the value of CMOs and MBS. The financial service industry 
was flooded with subprime mortgage products of declining value. Losses to bank capital were 
nearly $150 billion, with many specialized mortgage banking institutions entering bankruptcy 
(Kregel 2008). The systemic integration of financial institutions and the rise in mortgage 
innovation products, such as credit default swaps and synthetic collateralized debt obligation, 
intensified the subprime mortgage crisis, which spread into a broader financial crisis (Barnett 
2011). The catalyst of the subprime mortgage crisis was the sheer volume of subprime mortgage 
origination from the moral hazard originators 
 
2.2.3 Post-crisis 
The regulatory scrutiny of the mortgage industry, particularly mortgage origination, increased 
post-crisis. Prior to the crisis, banks and non-banks were underregulated (Kaul & Goodman 2018). 
Financial reform legislation, namely, the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Dodd–Frank), passed in 2010 increased the regulatory compliance among 
originators and established the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). Non-bank and 
bank originators are regulated by significantly dissimilar standards given the differences in 
business models and corporate structures. Unlike banks, all non-bank mortgage originators must 
adhere to the originator requirements of the SAFE Act and the CFPB enforcement and exams 
(CHLA Report). Huszar and Yu (2016) find that non-bank origination lending standards varied 
                                               
2 Home purchase loan with a lower free-market value of the home than the remaining principle 
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significantly based on the severity of state-based regulation before 2008. Conversely, banks are 
subject to strict capital and liquidity requirements by respective bank regulators and subsequent 
changes to the capital rules under Basel III (Mortgage Banker Association). The differences in 
regulatory compliance costs have created a greater differentiated cost structure for bank and non-
bank origination. 
 
Since the crisis, countless lawsuits have been filed against originators for breaching the contractual 
obligations in representation and warranties. Despite this agreement, loan features and 
performance were direct violations because of the deterioration in underwriting standards (McCoy 
and Wachter 2016). A 2011 study finds that two-thirds of a sample of mortgage collateral for 
MBSs was lower in quantity than that presented by the lender and insufficient to support the 
transaction (Rhee 2015). These lawsuits, as well as the associated reputational damage, became 
another cost for originators. 
 
The increasing cost structure of origination has led to a significant rise in the shadow banking 
market share among residential mortgages. Buchak and colleagues (2017) calculate the succeeding 
increases. In 2007–2015, the market share of shadow banks in conforming mortgage origination 
nearly doubles from 30% to 50%. The increase is more prominent in the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) mortgage market that serves less creditworthy borrowers, increasing from 
45% to 75% over the same period. This condition coincides with the shift in the major market 
players. In 2011, 50% of the mortgage origination market was held by Wells Fargo, Bank of 
America, and J.P. Morgan Chase, but by 2016, these banks held less than 20% (Mortgage Banker 
Association, 2016 Rankings). In these five years, Quicken Loans, now the third largest originator, 
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experienced an eight-fold increase in origination volume (Creswell 2017). Shadow banks such as 
PennyMac Financial Services, Freedom Mortgage, Caliber Home Loans, and loanDepot have 
recently joined the league tables for the largest 10 originators in the United States (Mortgage 
Banker Association, 2016 Rankings). 
 
2.3 Differences Among Tradition and Shadow Banks 
The Federal Stability Board defines banks as depository institutions, and shadow banks are 
financial servicers with no consumer deposits. These definitions are consistent among regulators 
in 20 countries, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Bank of International 
Settlements. Existing literature uses the same classification (Buchak et al., 2017). The business 
model, funding sources, and exposure risk distinctly differ between bank and non-bank 
originations.  
 
The business models for mortgage origination differ between traditional and shadow banks. For 
traditional banks, mortgage origination is one of its numerous core competencies, with mortgage 
assets accounting for at most 0.7% of a bank’s assets (Report to Congress). Traditional banks retain 
nearly 25% of their originated mortgages on their balance sheet, selling most of the remainder to 
GSEs, insurers, and other banks. Banks engage in regulatory capital arbitrage by retaining the 
higher-risk loans and selling the lower-risk loans to the secondary market (Ambrose et al. 2005). 
 
By contrast, most non-banks engage in only mortgage origination and mortgage servicing. 
Unlike banks, non-banks hold a significant mortgage exposure and lack business diversification, 
leaving them vulnerable to mortgage and MBS market risks. Mortgages are particularly volatile 
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because they are not traded on an open, observable market, and valuation is dependent on 
interest rates and default risks. Shadow banks have an “originate-to-distribute” model, retaining 
only 7.5% of originated mortgages on their balance sheet for seven days and selling government 
issued loans to Ginnie Mae and conforming loans to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. With GSEs 
purchasing nearly 85% of their mortgages, shadow banks are becoming increasingly reliant on 
the stability of GSEs (Buchak et al., 2017). Given the mixed findings on the success of GSEs in 
promoting their original purpose of home ownership and income equality, the continuation of 
these programs might change (Elenev et al. 2016, Hurst et al 2015, Bhutta 2012, Acharya et. al. 
2011). 
 
Access to funding sources differentiates the origination types. Traditional banks have stable, low-
cost funding sources from consumer deposits that are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation. Comparatively, shadow banks are reliant on external, less stable funding sources such 
as warehouse lending, bank loans, hedge funds, and private investors (Attom Data Solutions). The 
funding relationship between banks and non-banks creates an additional systemic risk that 
intensifies mortgage exposure in the industry cost (Stanton et al. 2014, 2017). Non-banks face a 
higher liquidity risk from maturity mismatches between its lending and borrowing as well as from 
the potential delinquency shocks and borrowing limits from their lenders. Additionally, non-bank 
servicers have lower investment credit ratings than banks, thus directly increasing their risk 
premium and funding (Kaul & Goodman 2018). 
 
2.4 Recent Market Trends 
2.4.1 Rising Interest Rates 
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The federal funds rate, the overnight inter-bank lending rate set by the Federal Reserve Bank, has 
experienced six rate hikes since 2016 after being at the zero-bound for nearly eight years. The 10-
year treasury rate decreased from 3.858 in January 2010 to 2.989 in May 2018 (Treasury). During 
periods of low interest rates, many borrowers are incentivized to refinance their mortgages to 
receive a lower rate and increase prepayment risk. Refinance opportunities are a large revenue 
source for shadow banks. 
 
Conversely, in periods of rising interest rates, non-banks experience higher funding costs. 
Expectancy theory explains that a surge in short-term interest rates increases all maturities across 
the yield curve to some degree, with larger effects on short-term rates (Cox et al. 2005). The 
originator can charge a higher interest rate on the mortgage, increasing the revenue value. Market 
competition constrains the increases in mortgage interest rates to a competitive price for customers, 
limiting the opportunities for excessive spread. However, non-banks face higher borrowing costs 
from their reliance on external funding sources, reducing origination profitability. As consumer 
deposits rates lag behind market interest rates, the private funding model for banks with access to 
cheap credit remains unchanged, enabling banks to fully benefit from the increased mortgage 
interest rates (Comptroller of the Currency). In a rising interest rate environment, banks’ 
origination model becomes relatively more profitable than that of non-banks because of funding 
structure differences. With greater profitability, banks are more likely to re-enter the mortgage 
origination market, and the additional competition further diminish the mortgage rates increases 
when interest rates rise. This study aims to understand the effect of interest rate changes on 
mortgage rates between banks and shadow banks.  
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As only a few non-bank originators are public companies, there is a general lack of public data 
and minimal literature on non-bank origination. Much of the existing literature focuses on pre-
recessionary trends rather than on crisis aftermath or recovery. Most studies on crisis aftermath 
center around the commercial mortgage market (Wong 2016, Ghent and Valkanov, 2015, An, 
Deng, and Gabriel, 2009) and the servicing aspect of intermediation (Kaul and Goodman 2016). 
The study of Buchak et al. (2017), which focuses on identifying the causes of shadow banking in 
the residential mortgage origination, is the only major research focusing on this specific market. 
 
3. EXPLORING MORTGAGE ORIGINATION  
3.1 Objective 
The objective of this study is to better understand the strength of the mortgage origination market 
and its ability to withstand the pressure of the rising interest rate. Regulation intends to promote 
safe lending standards and consumer protectionism among financial institutions, but this study 
determines the changes in lending behavior between bank and non-bank originators. A scenario 
analysis of the loan quality metrics for traditional banks and shadow banking in the mortgage 
origination market is conducted on the basis of interest rates changes. The scenario analysis is 
similar to that of The Report to Congress on the Effect of Capital Rules on Mortgage Servicing 
Assets (MSA) on the expected effects on MSA valuation based on changes in the yield curve, 
swaption volatility, normal servicing cost, and constant default rate, among many other indicators 
(Report to Congress). A secondary regression analysis calculates the loan quality deterioration and 
default risk of mortgage origination over time. Altogether, a greater understanding of the 
responsiveness and strength of the traditional and shadow banking mortgage origination markets 
is provided.  
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3.2 Datasets 
3.2.1 Fannie Mae Single-Family Loan Performance Data 
Based on a subset of Fannie Mae’s 30-year, fully amortizing, full documentation, single-family, 
fixed-rate mortgage loans, this dataset provides quarterly origination and performance data. Each 
quarter profiles 300,000–700,000 loans. The loan-level panel data provide information on 
borrower characteristics [e.g., borrower credit scores, interest rates, loan-to-value (LTV) ratios], 
originator name, monthly payment history [e.g., delinquency and prepayment], and loan 
properties. With data available from January 2000 to June 2017, the analysis focuses on pre-
recessionary data from January 2010 to March 2017. Approximately 14.8 million loans are 
included in this analysis.  
 
The FHA dataset, which covers FHA loans to individuals with low credit scores, provided by the 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development would have been a more appropriate loan 
portfolio comparison. However, it excludes FICO scores, data essential for the analysis of this 
study. 
 
3.2.2 National Mortgage Risk Index (NMRI) 
The NMRI measures the safety of the mortgage lending marketing in the United States. Using the 
default experience of loans originating in 2007 to quantify performance after a collapse, stress tests 
are developed to evaluate the risk of government guaranteed loans given a financial collapse on 
par with the recent recession. This index developed by the American Enterprise Institute is the best 
measure available to quantify lending standards in the current mortgage market. It covers nearly 
all of government-issued mortgages and 75% of all new mortgages. In particular, it includes home 
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purchase and refinance loans securitized and acquired by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae or 
guaranteed by the FHA, Department of Veteran Affairs, or Rural Housing Services. As the data 
are available from September 2012 to August 2017, the analysis includes all data until March 2017 
to correlate with the conforming loan data. 
 
3.2.3 10 – Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 
The dataset represents the historical yield curve rate for the 10-year Treasury note. The Department 
of Treasury derives the values daily using a quasi-cubic hermite spline function with similar inputs 
to the close-of-business bids for on-the-run securities (Treasury). The 10-year Treasury is often 
utilized as an interest rate benchmark and comparison because of its relative stability and 
representative qualities.   
 
3.2.4. Effective Federal Funds Rate 
The Federal Open Market Committee sets a guideline range for the federal funds rates called the 
overnight interbank lending rate. The effective federal funds rate is the actual market federal funds 
rate calculated through a volume-weighted median of overnight interbank transactions (Federal 
Reserve Bank of NY). The federal funds rate commonly serves as a benchmark of short-term rates.  
 
3.3 Methodology 
The Fannie Mae Single-Family Loan Performance dataset was used to determine the trends in 
mortgage origination between banks and non-banks since the crisis. Each loan was categorized on 
the basis of its type of originator, either bank or non-bank. The data were further divided according 
to the FICO scores of the borrower to better understand the trends among the borrower risk 
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profiles. The summary statistics for each type of originator and borrower risk profile for all 
specified quarters was compiled. Further analysis on this data in comparison with the 10-year 
Treasury yield, federal funds rates, and NMRI predicts the effect from the interest rate increase on 
loan quality.   
 
3.3.1 Categorization of Originator Type 
Each of the 14.8 million loans in the acquisition data from the Fannie Mae Single-Family Loan 
Performance dataset was classified according to originator type. The categorization of banks and 
non-banks is consistent in existing literature. Gete and Reher (2017), Demyanyk and Loutskina 
(2016), and Huszar and Yu (2017) identify non-banks as lenders without Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Actcodes, as they are not under the regulatory oversight of Federal Reserve System, 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of Thrift Supervision, Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency, or National Credit Union Administration. The sample also matches the manually 
defined list of bank and non-bank originators created by Buchak et al. (2017). Figure XXX lists 
the defined bank and shadow bank originators. 
 
3.3.2 FICO Score Divide 
Calculations were performed by dividing the loans into categories based on the borrower’s FICO 
score. The FICO score ranges were as follows: below 620, 620–660, 660–700, 700–740, 740–780, 
and 780+. Similar to the methodology of Calem and LaCour–Little (2002), Fortowosky et al. 
(2011), and Ding et al. (2011), these scores represent impaired, subprime, A-, prime, and super-
prime credit levels. The 40-point spread allows for more refined comparisons among the borrower 
risk types.  
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3.3.3 Summary Statistics 
For each quarter, the following categories were calculated for each type of originator and borrower 
risk using a volume-weighted mean: total unpaid principal balance (UPB), average UPB balance, 
LTV, combined loan-to-value (CLTV), debt-to-income (DTI), FICO score, and note rate. These 
categories include all the available loan quality indicators provided in the Fannie Mae Single-
Family Loan Performance dataset. Figures XII–XVII show the summary statistics for the past 28 
quarters of the mortgage origination data.  
 
3.4 Scenario Analysis 
The scenario analysis calculates the expected percentage change in loan quality metrics based on 
interest rate movements. The selected loan quality metrics are reconcilable with those provided in 
the Fannie Mae dataset, including note rate, average UPB, DTI, LTV, and CLTV. The interest rate 
scenarios follow the parallel movement in the yield curve by negative 25 basis points (bps), 
negative 50 bps, negative 100 bps, positive 25 bps, positive 50 bps, and positive 100 bps. These 
scenarios are consistent with the hypothetical interest rate scenarios in the Report to Congress on 
the Effects of Capital Rules on Mortgage Servicing Assets. The expected changes are calculated 
using individual regression models for each loan quality metrics and then by computing the 
expected level based on interest rate bps shifts. 
 
3.4.1 Note Rate 
The expected movements in the note rate were calculated by creating a regression analysis to 
understand the correlation among interest and note rates. The note rate represents the agreed upon 
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30-year fixed mortgage rate for the borrower. The analysis uses the Fannie Mae dataset and the 
10-year Treasury yields from January 2010 to March 2017.  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒%	'() = 𝛽, + 𝛽.𝑇) 	+ 𝑋%1Γ + 𝛿() + 𝜖%	'(), 
where 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒%	'() measures the rate of the note, and 𝑇) represents the 10-year Treasury rate to control 
for the interest rate effects. The regression controls for the quarter fixed effects of the lender type 𝑗 and the borrower risk profile 𝑧. 
 
3.4.2 Average Unpaid Principle Balance 
The expected movements in the average UPB were calculated by creating a regression analysis to 
understand the correlation between the interest rates and the average UPB. This measurement 
calculates the size of the mortgage. The analysis uses the Fannie Mae dataset and the 10-year 
Treasury yields from January 2010 to March 2017.  𝐴𝑣𝑔. 𝑈𝑃𝐵%	'() = 𝛽, + 𝛽.𝑇) 	+ 𝑋%1Γ + 𝛿() + 𝜖%	'(), 
where 𝐴𝑣𝑔. 𝑈𝑃𝐵%	'() measures the average UPB of the note and 𝑇) represents the 10-year Treasury 
rate to control for the interest rate effects. The regression controls for the quarter fixed effects of 
the lender type 𝑗 and the borrower risk profile 𝑧. 
 
3.4.3 Debt – to – Income 
The expected movements in the DTI levels were calculated by creating a regression analysis to 
understand the correlation between the interest rates and the DTI. This measurement is an estimate 
of the borrower’s ability to pay the mortgage based on income level and is usually a delinquency 
metric. The analysis uses the Fannie Mae dataset and the 10-year Treasury yields from January 
2010 to March 2017.  
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𝐷𝑇𝐼%	'() = 𝛽, + 𝛽.𝑇) 	+ 𝑋%1Γ + 𝛿() + 𝜖%	'(), 
where 𝐷𝑇𝐼%	'() measures the DTI of the note, and 𝑇) represents the 10-year Treasury rate to control 
for the interest rate effects. The regression controls for the quarter fixed effects of the lender type 𝑗 and the borrower risk profile 𝑧. 
 
3.4.4 Loan – to – Value Ratio 
The expected movements in the LTV levels were calculated by creating a regression analysis to 
understand the correlation between the interest rates and the LTV. This measurement calculates 
the size of the borrower’s equity stake and financial exposure to the home. The analysis uses the 
Fannie Mae dataset and the 10-year Treasury yields from January 2010 to March 2017.  𝐿𝑇𝑉%	'() = 𝛽, + 𝛽.𝑇) 	+ 𝑋%1Γ + 𝛿() + 𝜖%	'(), 
where 𝐿𝑇𝑉%	'() measures the LTV of the note, and 𝑇) represents the 10-year Treasury rate to control 
for the interest rate effects. The regression controls for the quarter fixed effects of the lender type 𝑗 and the borrower risk profile 𝑧. 
 
3.4.5 Combined Loan – to – Value Ratio 
The expected movements in the CLTV levels were calculated by creating a regression analysis to 
understand the correlation between the interest rates and the CLTV. Taking into account all loans 
secured by a property, this measurement calculates the size of the homeowner’s equity stake and 
financial exposure to the home. It is usually a more comprehensive measurement than LTV. The 
analysis uses the Fannie Mae dataset and the 10-year Treasury yields from January 2010 to March 
2017.  𝐶𝐿𝑇𝑉%	'() = 𝛽, + 𝛽.𝑇) 	+ 𝑋%1Γ + 𝛿() + 𝜖%	'(), 
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where 𝐶𝐿𝑇𝑉%	'() measures the CLTV of the note, and 𝑇) represents the 10-year Treasury rate to 
control for the interest rate effects. The regression controls for the quarter fixed effects of the lender 
type 𝑗 and the borrower risk profile 𝑧. 
 
3.5 Mortgage Risk Index Regression 
To understand the loan quality and default risk, a final regression analysis compared the NMRI 
with the 10-year Treasury yield. Only the NMRI data coverage of the Fannie Mae dataset was used 
to ensure consistency in the analysis throughout the paper. The purpose of this regression is to 
determine the deterioration in loan quality in relation to the interest rate changes. 𝑁𝑀𝑅𝐼%	'() = 𝛽.𝑇) + 𝛽G	𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒%	'() + 𝑋%1Γ + 𝛿() + 𝜖%	'(), 
where 𝑁𝑀𝑅𝐼%	'() measures the default risk of the portfolio under the same stresses of 2007, and 𝑇) 
represents the 10-year Treasury rate to control for the interest rate effects. The regression controls 
for the quarter fixed effects of the lender type 𝑗 and the borrower risk profile 𝑧.  
 
3.6 Results 
3.6.1 Scenario Analysis 
The results of the effect of the parallel interest rate movements on the loan characteristics are fully 
detailed in Tables XVIII–XXIII in the appendix. Table II catalogs the interest rate effects on the 
traditional and shadow bank originated loans for borrowers with FICO scores of 620–660. The 
remainder of the results show the findings from the scenario analysis with supplemental charts and 
tables to further explain the data.  
 
Figure II: Scenario Analysis of Loans with FICO Scores 620 - 660 
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Interest Rate Average UPB DTI LTV CLTV 
 Bank Non-Bank Bank 
Non-
Bank Bank 
Non-
Bank Bank 
Non-
Bank Bank 
Non-
Bank 
100 bps 10.5% 11.5% (7.2%) (11.9%) 1.0% 1.2% (4.6%) (2.2%) (4.5%) (2.0%) 
50 bps 5.2% 5.8% (3.6%) (6.0%) 0.5% 0.6% (2.3%) (1.1%) (2.3%) (1.0%) 
25 bps 2.6% 2.9% (1.8%) (3.0%) 0.3% 0.3% (1.1%) (0.6%) (1.1%) (0.5%) 
-25 bps (2.6%) (2.9%) 1.8% 3.0% (0.3%) (0.3%) 1.1% 0.6% 1.1% 0.5% 
-50 bps (5.2%) (5.8%) 3.6% 6.0% (0.5%) (0.6%) 2.3% 1.1% 2.3% 1.0% 
-100 bps (10.5%) (11.5%) 7.2% 11.9% (1.0%) (1.2%) 4.6% 2.2% 4.5% 2.0% 
 
Figures XXV–XXIX in the appendix provide the summary statistics for the note rate regression, 
average UBP regression, DTI regression, LTV regression, and CLTV regression for banks and 
non-banks. The summary statistics provide information about the formulas used to extrapolate the 
effects of interest rates changes on loan quality. Figure III shows the summary statistics calculated 
for each regression using R. For all the regressions, all the values are significant at a 95% 
confidence interval. However, the 𝛽, value for non-banks and FICO scores below 620 are 
significant at a 90% confidence interval. Overall, the regressions are significant. 
 
Figure III: Summary Statistics on Note Rate Regression of Non-Bank & FICO: Below 620 
 Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -2.1509 0.7757 -2.773 0.00995 ** 
Slope 0.9952 0.1713 5.809 3.51E-06 *** 
RMSE 0.4281  F-statistic 20.15  
R-Squared 0.4274  P-Value 0.00012  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Figure IV: Correlation among Note Rates and 10-Year Treasury by FICO Score  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The scenario analysis results show that for note rates, non-banks are more sensitive to rate 
increases than banks. For further support, Figure IV maps the correlation between the note rates 
and the 10-year Treasury yields for banks and non-banks from 2010 to 2017. As the borrower’s 
FICO score increases, the difference between the bank and non-bank correlation with the Treasury 
declines. At its peak for borrowers with a FICO score below 620, the gap is 36 points and narrows 
down to three points for top quality homeowners. The correlation for non-banks exceeds 0.75 for 
all profiles of borrower risk. The high correlation for non-banks is partially expected because their 
funding model is reliant on short-term capital from warehouse lending, bank loans, hedge funds, 
and private investors. By contrast, the federally insured consumer deposits used for funding 
mortgages for banks is less influenced by short-term rates. Assuming that the 10-year Treasury 
rate represents the funding cost for non-banks, this graph demonstrates the trend that mortgage 
origination becomes more profitable for banks than non-bank as the interest rates increase. As the 
bank and non-bank mortgage note rates are relatively comparable across originator types, banks 
earn a higher spread than subprime borrowers.  
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The graph also indicates that for subprime mortgages originated by banks, only half of the variation 
is explained by interest rate changes. The remaining variation may be attributable to other factors, 
such as increased risk premium due to reputational risk, legal fees, and increased regulatory 
burden. In general, banks are subject to more intensive capital requirements, particularly banks 
with over $50 billion in assets that are subject to Federal Reserve supervision.  
Figure V: Rate Premium (Discount) for Non-Banks (2015 – 2017)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure V demonstrate the differences in note rates between bank and non-bank lenders. The rate 
premium (discount) for non-banks was calculated by subtracting the traditional bank note rate from 
that of the non-bank for each bucket of FICO scores. A premium indicates that non-banks charge 
a higher rate than banks, whereas a discount indicates that non-banks charge a lower note rate than 
banks. The chart shows that non-banks historically have had a competitive advantage in originating 
loans with lower FICO scores because they are able to charge lower rates to borrowers, particularly 
those with FICO scores below 660. This outcome may be attributable to the combination with 
higher risk premium charged by banks or the simple operational efficiency of non-banks. Banks 
have a competitive advantage over prime mortgages. Through the decades, traditional banks have 
(0.2)
(0.1)
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0.3
2015Q1 2015Q3 2016Q1 2016Q3 2017Q1
Subprime 620-660 660-700 700-740 740-780 780+
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established this dominant position. According to the Fannie Mae dataset, banks originated over 
60% of the 780 plus mortgages in the first quarter of 2017.  
  
Figure VI: Risk Spread between Prime and Subprime Borrower (2015 – 2017)  
 
 
 
Banks charge a higher risk premium for subprime lending than non-banks. Figure VI demonstrates 
the risk spread between prime and subprime borrowers in 2015–2017. The risk spread was 
calculated by subtracting the note rate for borrowers with FICO scores below 620 from the note 
rate for borrowers with FICO scores above 780 for each quarter for banks and non-banks. For 
higher-risk borrowers, non-banks have had a lower risk premium that has narrowed over time since 
2015. In 2015, there was a 5 bps differential that increased by 439% to 24 bps in 2017. Assuming 
that funding costs are constant across all banks and the same for all non-banks, this graph 
demonstrates that banks charge borrowers a higher risk premium rate than non-banks. This 
outcome may be attributable to the differences in business models among originators or the more 
intensive regulatory compliance required for banks. Further investigation is required to better 
understand the risk spread among banks, the distribution of origination by FICO scores for 
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different types of banks (larger banks originating mortgages for all types of borrowers or focusing 
on prime mortgages), and other factors that contribute to the risk premium.  
  
Figure VII: Average Unpaid Balance Correlation with Lagged 10-Year Treasury Yield 
Figure VII demonstrates the correlation between the 10-year Treasury yield lagged by one quarter 
and the average UPB for banks and non-banks in 2015–2017. The one quarter lag allows the 
originator time to incorporate the changes and adjust the mortgage terms, as evidenced by the 
greater correlation with the mortgage data. The negative correlation indicates that as interest rates 
rise, the average loan size declines. Non-banks have a stronger negative correlation than banks; 
this result is expected because of the differences in funding costs based on originator types. The 
correlation declines significantly for subprime borrowers, indicating that other factors explain 
more of the variation. This outcome can be attributable to endogenous compounding factors that 
profile the type of individuals in higher-risk categories. Furthermore, the negative correlation and 
this graph explain the trend that as interest rates rise, the affordability of loans declines, forcing 
borrowers to borrower small quantities of money. In a rising interest rate environment, origination 
volume and UPB size are expected to decline.   
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Figure VIII: LTV & CTLV Correlation with Lagged 10-Year Treasury Yield (2010 – 2017) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure VIII shows the correlation among the 10-year Treasury yield lagged by one quarter, the 
LTV and the CLTV for banks and non-banks. The one quarter lag enables the originator time to 
incorporate the changes and adjust the mortgage terms, as evidenced by the greater correlation 
with mortgage data. The positive correlation indicates that as the interest rates rise, less equity is 
required on the house. The positive trend demonstrates that the LTV and CLTV are more correlated 
with the interest rates as the borrower’s FICO score increases. Another interpretation is that other 
factors, such as regulation, affect the lending standards for subprime mortgages. In particular, the 
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae conforming loan requirements have an eligibility matrix with stricter 
requirements for more risky borrowers. This matrix demonstrates that originators prefer origin-
conforming loans, emphasizing the power and influence of the conforming loan requirements as a 
safeguard in the mortgage market.  
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Figure IX: Change in Debt-to-Income Levels (2010 – 2017) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure IX highlights the changes in DTI levels over the past seven years. As a prominent 
measurement of borrower’s ability to pay, DTI indicates loan quality. A decline in DTI levels 
shows an improvement in lending standards by requiring more income coverage, whereas an 
increased in DTI indicates deterioration in lending standards. In general, non-banks have 
demonstrated a larger relative improvement in DTI levels, but non-bank DTI levels are higher. A 
10.3% and a 9.5% decrease in DTI have been found for borrowers with FICO scores below 620 
for non-banks and banks, respectively. The increase of 3.0% and 2.0% in DTI for borrowers with 
FICO scores above 780 for non-banks and banks, respectively, may be attributable to the overly 
strict lending standards immediately after the crisis. Overall, DTI levels demonstrate continued 
improvement in lending quality across borrower risk levels. 
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3.6.1 National Mortgage Risk Index Regression 
The results show an increase in the portion of high-risk loan origination. Overall, the portfolio 
default based on the NMRI index of Fannie Mae data increased by 36% since 2012. A 116% 
increase in the proportion of high-risk loans and an 18% increase in medium-risk loans were found 
from 2012. High-risk loans are defined as those having greater than a 12% default rate under the 
hypothetical stress scenarios modeled after the recent financial crisis, and medium-risk loans have 
6%–12% stress default risk. A 0.53 correlation was found between the high-risk loans and the 
federal funds rate and a 0.48 correlation between the entire index and the federal funds rate. No 
significant correlation was observed between the NMRI and the 10-year Treasury or lagged 10-
year Treasury. This dataset indicates a significant deterioration in loan quality and an increasing 
inability to withstand a crisis.  
 
Figure X: Risk Profile of Fannie Mae Loans Under NMRI Stressed Conditions 
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4. INSIGHTS & CONCLUSIONS 
4.1 Discussion  
The scenario analysis indicates significant statistical evidence of the differences in loan quality 
between banks and non-banks based on interest rate shifts. Non-banks are more sensitive to interest 
rate movements than banks for the note rate, LTV, and CLTV. A higher correlation is expected 
because of the non-bank reliance on short-term lending for underwriting.  
 
The analysis suggests that origination becomes increasingly more profitable for banks as interest 
rates rise. As funding cost structures for banks and non-bank are private information, it is only 
possible to extrapolate them based on revenue. The non-bank rate premium for prime borrowers 
has increased over 100% since the first federal funds rate hike and 280% since 2015, indicating a 
competitive advantage. Conversely, banks have a larger risk premium associated with subprime 
borrowers than non-banks. This outcome is likely attributable to the increased regulatory 
compliance and reputational risks relative to non-banks. As interest rates rise, the increased 
profitability incentivizes banks to increase their market share for prime lending, but their high-risk 
premium for subprime lending discourages expansion in this sector.  
 
The scenario analysis has conflicting evidence of loan deterioration. As interest rates rise, DTI is 
expected to increase and LTV and CLTV to decrease, creating ambiguity in loan deterioration. 
Since 2010, DTI has improved to a safer level for subprime lending for banks and non-banks. More 
interestingly, CLTV and LTV for prime mortgages are correlated with the interest rates for prime 
mortgages but show no correlation with subprime mortgages. This finding may be attributable to 
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the eligibility matrix for conforming loans set by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which have stricter 
standards for subprime mortgages than for prime ones. The originators, especially the non-bank 
ones with an “originate-to-distribute” model, are particularly reliant on GSEs, value the 
conforming loan status, and thus adhere to these standards. The conforming loan standards are 
particularly important in preventing loan deterioration in a rising interest rate environment.   
 
By contrast, the NMRI analysis indicates significant loan deterioration. With a 36% increase in 
the stress default rate, loan portfolio standards have clearly declined. Reconciling this with the 
findings from the scenario analysis, originators may be optimizing origination and maximizing 
returns by underwriting mortgages that exactly meet the minimum standards for conforming loans. 
This assumption is supported by the increase in Fintech shadow banks that offer better products 
by providing disruptive mortgage technology (Buchak et al. 2017). This condition ensures the 
perception of safe CLTV, DTI, and LTV levels, but the overall loan portfolio will only be as safe 
as the guidelines set by conforming loan standards.  
 
4.2 Conclusion 
The financial crisis and protectionism regulation have fundamentally changed many financial 
markets. Given limited historical precedence and minimal research, knowledge on the long-term 
effect from these significant market changes is deficient. The rise of shadow banking in mortgage 
origination is one small piece in the broader discussion about the effect of regulation on financial 
markets. The residential mortgage market is the largest consumer loan market in the United States 
worth over $10 trillion, representing a relevant case study on the potential risks arising from a new 
market structure. Without the rise of shadow banking and its associated mortgage provisions to 
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homeowners, the cost of credit will increase, constricting the housing market and further 
contracting the economy. A large benefit from this change in market structure is that asset risk is 
diverted from systemically important financial institutions to isolated shadow banks on the surface 
level. While the contagion risk is contained, concerns over the creation of new risk and the 
longevity of these shadow banks arise.  
 
The scenario analysis demonstrated that non-banks are more sensitive to interest rate shifts. In a 
rising interest rate environment, banks have relatively increased profitability and are likely to 
increase the prime mortgage origination market share. Banks increasing their market presence in 
the subprime mortgage origination market is contingent on their increased profitability exceeding 
their elevated risk premium. Despite the increased competition, the analysis suggests that loan 
quality is correlated with the interest rate as long as it still adheres to the eligibility matrix for 
conforming loans. These standards provide a safeguard in loan quality, preventing a race to the 
bottom. Loan quality will be as safe as the conforming loan requirements.  
 
  
31 
 
5. REFERENCES 
Ashcraft, Adam B., and T. Scheurmann, 2008, Understanding the Securitization of Subprime  
Mortgage Credit. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report. 
Acharya, Viral V., Matthew Richardson, Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, and Lawrence J. White. 2011,  
Guaranteed to fail: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the debacle of mortgage finance. 
Princeton University Press.  
Agarwal, Sumit, David Lucca, Amit Seru, and Francesco Trebbi, 2014, Inconsistent regulators:  
Evidence from banking, Quarterly Journal of Economics 129, 889-938.  
Agarwal, Sumit, Gene Amromin, Itzhak Ben-David, Souphala Chomsisengphet, Tomasz  
Piskorski, Amit Seru, 2017, Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from 
Home Affordable Modification Program, Journal of Political Economy 125, 654-712.  
Ambrose, Brent W., M. Lacour-Little, and A. B. Sanders, 2005, Does Regulatory Capital  
Arbitrage, Reputation, or Asymmetric Information Drive Securitization? Journal of 
Financial Services Research 28:1/2/3 113–133. 
Amir, E., T. S. Harris, and E. K. Venuti, 1993, A comparison of the value-relevance of US  
versus non-US-GAAP accounting measures using Form 20-F reconciliations. Journal of  
Accounting Research 31 (Supplement): 230–264. 
An, Xudong, Yongheng Deng, and Stuart A. Gabriel, 2009, Asymmetric Information, Adverse  
Selection, and the Pricing of CMBS. Journal of Financial Economics 100:304–325.  
Attom Data Solutions, 2016, The Housing News Report” Volume 10 Issue 10.  
Ayotte, Kenneth M., and S. Gaon, 2005, Asset-Backed Securities: Costs and Benefits of  
“Bankruptcy Remoteness”. 
Bailey, Martin N., R. E. Litan, M. S. Johnson, 2008, The Origins of the Financial Crisis.  
Initiative on Business and Public Policy at Brookings. 
Barnett, Harold C, 2011, And Some with a Fountain Pen: Mortgage Fraud, Securitization and the  
Subprime Bubble. Columbia University Press, Forthcoming. 
Berndt, Antje, and Anurag Gupta, 2009, Moral hazard and adverse selection in the originate-to-  
distribute model of bank credit, Journal of Monetary Economics 56, 725-743.  
Bhutta, Neil, 2012, GSE activity and mortgage supply in lower-income and minority  
neighborhoods: The effect of the affordable housing goals, Journal of Real Estate 
Finance and Economics 45, 238-261.  
32 
 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,  
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and National Credit Union Administration,  
2016, Report to the Congress on the Effect of Capital Rules on Mortgage Servicing 
Assets.  
Buchak, Greg, Gregor Matvos, Tomasz Piskorski and Amit Seru, 2017, Fintech, Regulatory  
Arbitrage, and the Rise of Shadow Banks, Working paper.  
Community Home Leaders Association, 2017, CHLA Report on Independent Mortgage Bankers  
(IMB). 
Comptroller of the Currency. 2012. Interest Rate Risk Comptroller’s Handbook.  
Cox, John C., J. E. Ingersoll, Jr., and S. A. Ross. 2005. A Theory Of The Term Structure Of  
Interest Rates. Theory of Valuation: 2nd: 129-164. 
Creswell, Julie, 2017, Quicken Loans, the New Mortgage Machine. New York Times  
Elenev Vadim, Tim Landvoigt, and Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, 2016, Phasing Out the GSEs,  
Journal of Monetary Economics 81, 111-132.  
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 2018. Federal Funds Data.  
Ghent, Andra and Rossen Valkanov, 2015, Comparing Securitized and Balance Sheet Loans:  
Size Matters. Management Science :1–20Articles in Advance.  
Haughwout, Andrew, Ebiere Okah, and Joseph Tracy, 2016, Second Chances: Subprime  
Mortgage Modification and Redefault, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 48, 771- 
793.  
Hurst, Erik, Benjamin J. Keys, Amit Seru, and Joseph Vavra, 2016, Regional redistribution  
through the US mortgage market, American Economic Review 106, 2982-3028.  
Huszar, Zsuzsa, and Wei Yu. 2016. Mortgage Lending Regulatory Arbitrage: A Cross-Sectional  
Analysis of Nonbank Lenders. Journal of Real Estate Research, Forthcoming 
Kaul, Karan and Laurie Goodman, 2016, Nonbank Servicer Regulation: New Capital and  
Liquidity Requirements Don’t Offer Enough Loss Protection. Urban Institute.  
Keys, Benjamin J., Tanmoy Mukherjee, Amit Seru, and Vikrant Vig, 2010, Did securitization  
lead to lax screening? Evidence from subprime loans, Quarterly Journal of Economics  
125, 307-362.  
Keys, Benjamin J., Tomasz Piskorski, Amit Seru, and Vikrant Vig, 2013, Mortgage financing in  
the housing boom and bust. In Housing and Financial Crisis, edited by Edward L.  
33 
 
Glaeser and Todd Sinai, 143-204, University of Chicago Press  
Kregel, Jan. Changes in the U.S. Financial System and the Subprime Crisis. The Levy Economics  
Institute Working Paper Collection. 
McCoy, Patricia and S. Wachter, 2016, Representatives and Warranties: Why Did They Not Stop  
the Crisis Evidence and Innovation in Housing Law and Policy, Forthcoming 2017. 
Mayer, Christopher, Edward Morrison, Tomasz Piskorski, and Arpit Gupta, 2014, Mortgage  
modification and strategic behavior: Evidence from a legal settlement with  
Countrywide, American Economic Review 104, 2830-2857.  
Mortgage Bankers Association 2016, Basel III Treatment of Mortgage Servicing Assets 
Piskorski, Tomasz, Amit Seru, James Witkin, 2015, Asset Quality Misrepresentation by  
Financial intermediaries: Evidence from the RMBS market, Journal of Finance 70, 2635- 
2678.  
Purnanandam, Amiyatosh, 2011, Originate-to-distribute model and the subprime mortgage  
crisis." Review of Financial Studies 24, 1881-1915.  
Stanton, Richard, Nancy Wallace, and Jonathan Walden, 2014, The industrial organization of the  
U.S. residential mortgage market, Annual Review of Financial Economics 6, 259-288.  
Stanton, Richard, Nancy Wallace, and Jonathan Walden, 2017, Mortgage Loan-Flow Networks  
and Financial Norms, working paper.  
Rhee, June, 2015, Getting Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Right: Why Governance  
Matters.  Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance 20, no. 2: 273-322 
U.S. Department of the Treasury. 2009. Treasury Yield Curve Methodology.  U.S. Department of  
Treasury Resource Center. 
Wong, Maisy, 2016. CMBS and Conflicts of Interest: Evidence from Ownership Changes for  
Servicers, Working Paper.  
  
34 
 
6. APPENDIX 
Figure XI: Subprime Mortgage Origination by Originator Type 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Non-Bank Origination Volume for Borrowers with FICO Scores 620 - 640 
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Figure XII: Summary Statistics of FICO Scores: Below 620 
Bank  Non-Bank 
 Average UBP LTV CLTV DTI FICO 
Note 
Rate   
Average 
UBP LTV CLTV DTI FICO 
Note 
Rate 
2010Q1 156,614 63.4 64.2 38.5 602.5 5.39  2010Q1 156,614 63.4 64.2 38.5 602.5 5.39 
2010Q2 155,500 64.7 64.7 35.3 604.4 5.29  2010Q2 155,500 64.7 64.7 35.3 604.4 5.29 
2010Q3 161,258 69.7 69.9 35.1 599.7 5.22  2010Q3 161,258 69.7 69.9 35.1 599.7 5.22 
2010Q4 169,270 69.0 69.2 34.6 588.6 4.89  2010Q4 169,270 69.0 69.2 34.6 588.6 4.89 
2011Q1 170,964 66.7 67.3 34.1 602.8 4.58  2011Q1 170,964 66.7 67.3 34.1 602.8 4.58 
2011Q2 153,893 67.2 67.7 34.9 603.8 5.00  2011Q2 153,893 67.2 67.7 34.9 603.8 5.00 
2011Q3 149,970 70.9 71.5 32.4 609.4 4.86  2011Q3 149,970 70.9 71.5 32.4 609.4 4.86 
2011Q4 160,086 73.5 74.8 36.2 607.9 4.77  2011Q4 160,086 73.5 74.8 36.2 607.9 4.77 
2012Q1 192,065 69.8 70.4 36.4 609.9 4.50  2012Q1 192,065 69.8 70.4 36.4 609.9 4.50 
2012Q2 167,079 66.3 66.3 36.6 616.2 4.21  2012Q2 167,079 66.3 66.3 36.6 616.2 4.21 
2012Q3 207,556 68.7 71.2 32.3 611.2 4.12  2012Q3 207,556 68.7 71.2 32.3 611.2 4.12 
2012Q4 202,000 68.5 70.2 33.7 606.3 3.84  2012Q4 202,000 68.5 70.2 33.7 606.3 3.84 
2013Q1 215,589 69.8 70.6 36.2 602.0 3.89  2013Q1 215,589 69.8 70.6 36.2 602.0 3.89 
2013Q2 209,893 68.6 70.0 36.8 608.6 4.02  2013Q2 209,893 68.6 70.0 36.8 608.6 4.02 
2013Q3 180,647 68.0 69.0 35.4 614.0 4.10  2013Q3 180,647 68.0 69.0 35.4 614.0 4.10 
2013Q4 205,838 71.4 71.6 35.9 611.0 4.43  2013Q4 205,838 71.4 71.6 35.9 611.0 4.43 
2014Q1 174,625 71.7 72.6 34.8 608.0 4.53  2014Q1 174,625 71.7 72.6 34.8 608.0 4.53 
2014Q2 177,206 72.3 73.1 37.4 619.1 4.70  2014Q2 177,206 72.3 73.1 37.4 619.1 4.70 
2014Q3 206,661 77.1 77.6 36.9 606.8 4.65  2014Q3 206,661 77.1 77.6 36.9 606.8 4.65 
2014Q4 199,500 74.2 74.8 38.2 611.8 4.72  2014Q4 199,500 74.2 74.8 38.2 611.8 4.72 
2015Q1 213,044 77.3 77.6 36.7 609.6 4.52  2015Q1 213,044 77.3 77.6 36.7 609.6 4.52 
2015Q2 180,421 68.3 68.3 36.4 617.7 4.34  2015Q2 180,421 68.3 68.3 36.4 617.7 4.34 
2015Q3 209,804 79.4 80.8 36.8 602.9 4.33  2015Q3 209,804 79.4 80.8 36.8 602.9 4.33 
2015Q4 217,638 79.0 79.7 36.3 607.0 4.53  2015Q4 217,638 79.0 79.7 36.3 607.0 4.53 
2016Q1 188,419 69.7 69.7 35.1 620.0 4.45  2016Q1 188,419 69.7 69.7 35.1 620.0 4.45 
2016Q2 197,231 71.7 71.7 35.5 620.0 4.40  2016Q2 197,231 71.7 71.7 35.5 620.0 4.40 
2016Q3 213,275 72.8 73.2 35.6 620.0 4.25  2016Q3 213,275 72.8 73.2 35.6 620.0 4.25 
2016Q4 205,433 70.9 71.3 36.7 620.0 4.10  2016Q4 205,433 70.9 71.3 36.7 620.0 4.10 
2017Q1 187,150 70.0 70.5 35.0 620.0 4.36  2017Q1 187,150 70.0 70.5 35.0 620.0 4.36 
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Figure XIII: Summary Statistics of FICO Scores: 620 - 660 
 Bank  Non-Bank 
 Average UBP LTV CLTV DTI FICO 
Note 
Rate 
  Average UBP LTV CLTV DTI FICO 
Note 
Rate 
2010Q1 163,083 64.2 65.1 37.9 643.7 5.20  2010Q1 146,283 64.4 64.9 39.1 643.0 5.22 
2010Q2 162,425 64.0 64.7 35.3 644.3 5.17  2010Q2 129,743 64.7 65.3 34.7 643.2 5.06 
2010Q3 157,232 65.2 65.8 34.8 644.0 5.07  2010Q3 154,588 66.2 66.8 35.4 643.7 5.12 
2010Q4 169,858 64.6 65.3 34.7 644.6 4.73  2010Q4 158,412 63.6 64.4 34.9 644.1 4.77 
2011Q1 161,622 64.4 65.2 34.7 644.8 4.69  2011Q1 156,723 65.0 66.4 35.4 644.9 4.84 
2011Q2 152,702 65.5 66.1 35.5 644.4 5.04  2011Q2 146,386 67.8 68.2 35.8 644.0 5.15 
2011Q3 155,589 68.1 68.6 35.5 644.5 4.79  2011Q3 149,495 66.3 66.7 35.7 644.0 4.86 
2011Q4 164,346 67.3 67.9 35.0 645.0 4.49  2011Q4 159,646 66.5 67.2 35.6 643.7 4.48 
2012Q1 169,023 67.3 68.1 35.0 644.7 4.42  2012Q1 159,120 65.7 66.4 35.5 643.8 4.38 
2012Q2 175,959 67.7 68.5 34.8 644.7 4.30  2012Q2 164,837 66.2 66.9 35.1 644.3 4.27 
2012Q3 173,559 68.6 69.2 34.4 645.5 4.14  2012Q3 172,824 67.3 67.7 34.6 644.8 4.05 
2012Q4 176,192 68.6 69.4 34.7 645.8 3.86  2012Q4 175,142 66.4 67.1 34.9 644.8 3.87 
2013Q1 183,867 68.9 69.9 34.5 645.9 3.79  2013Q1 190,569 66.6 67.3 35.1 644.3 3.80 
2013Q2 186,360 68.2 69.1 34.6 646.3 3.83  2013Q2 169,098 66.7 67.3 35.1 643.6 3.86 
2013Q3 178,982 69.6 70.3 34.3 645.8 4.07  2013Q3 179,273 68.4 69.0 35.2 644.2 4.25 
2013Q4 175,179 70.0 70.6 35.4 645.9 4.61  2013Q4 164,357 68.7 69.2 35.7 643.2 4.62 
2014Q1 176,199 71.5 72.1 35.3 644.9 4.68  2014Q1 169,373 68.4 68.9 35.8 643.2 4.64 
2014Q2 180,450 72.4 72.9 35.5 644.4 4.67  2014Q2 170,969 70.1 70.5 35.8 643.5 4.69 
2014Q3 193,121 74.5 74.8 35.8 644.4 4.67  2014Q3 177,359 70.9 71.3 36.1 643.1 4.59 
2014Q4 198,320 74.0 74.5 36.0 644.3 4.58  2014Q4 181,518 70.8 71.2 36.0 643.4 4.59 
2015Q1 198,878 73.7 74.2 35.7 644.4 4.47  2015Q1 191,532 70.3 70.7 36.2 643.1 4.42 
2015Q2 199,471 72.6 73.1 35.3 644.7 4.30  2015Q2 198,364 70.7 71.1 36.1 643.3 4.28 
2015Q3 200,838 73.5 74.1 35.5 644.8 4.36  2015Q3 195,633 70.9 71.3 36.2 642.9 4.40 
2015Q4 201,834 74.5 75.1 36.0 644.1 4.47  2015Q4 192,137 70.3 70.7 35.8 642.8 4.39 
2016Q1 208,594 72.8 73.4 35.9 644.4 4.41  2016Q1 195,817 69.4 69.7 36.1 642.9 4.37 
2016Q2 202,254 73.5 74.3 35.9 644.7 4.33  2016Q2 203,987 70.6 70.9 36.1 642.9 4.19 
2016Q3 199,620 73.9 74.7 35.6 644.5 4.23  2016Q3 205,514 69.9 70.2 36.0 642.9 4.11 
2016Q4 201,205 73.6 74.5 36.1 644.7 4.09  2016Q4 210,115 69.2 69.5 36.0 643.0 3.99 
2017Q1 197,126 72.8 73.8 36.3 645.0 4.34  2017Q1 199,969 69.4 69.6 36.1 642.8 4.36 
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Figure XIV: Summary Statistics of FICO Scores: 660 - 700 
 Bank  Non-Bank 
 Average UBP LTV CLTV DTI FICO 
Note 
Rate 
  Average UBP LTV CLTV DTI FICO 
Note 
Rate 
2010Q1 192,522 66.3 67.3 37.1 683.7 5.07  2010Q1 182,569 65.7 66.8 37.5 683.5 5.10 
2010Q2 190,551 67.0 68.0 35.1 683.9 5.07  2010Q2 167,554 65.9 67.0 34.1 683.1 5.00 
2010Q3 192,670 67.8 68.6 34.6 684.1 4.92  2010Q3 183,336 68.9 69.7 35.1 683.3 4.99 
2010Q4 201,870 67.5 68.5 34.3 684.4 4.58  2010Q4 193,433 67.1 68.2 34.3 684.2 4.58 
2011Q1 195,402 67.5 68.8 34.5 684.4 4.58  2011Q1 182,834 67.5 69.1 34.2 684.1 4.66 
2011Q2 173,782 68.1 69.0 35.4 682.9 4.95  2011Q2 170,674 69.3 70.2 35.2 682.8 4.98 
2011Q3 183,657 70.6 71.3 35.2 683.4 4.69  2011Q3 172,328 70.1 70.9 35.3 683.5 4.71 
2011Q4 197,123 69.8 70.7 34.6 683.6 4.35  2011Q4 193,524 68.6 69.6 34.8 683.9 4.33 
2012Q1 195,585 69.8 70.9 34.6 683.7 4.26  2012Q1 188,238 68.6 69.8 34.8 683.7 4.23 
2012Q2 199,103 70.6 71.5 34.7 683.8 4.16  2012Q2 187,242 69.8 70.7 34.7 683.9 4.16 
2012Q3 202,775 71.2 72.1 34.2 684.0 3.96  2012Q3 201,449 71.2 72.0 34.7 684.0 3.94 
2012Q4 202,788 71.1 72.1 34.0 684.1 3.71  2012Q4 203,895 70.8 71.6 34.6 683.7 3.73 
2013Q1 208,810 70.6 71.7 34.1 683.8 3.65  2013Q1 214,705 70.7 71.7 34.8 683.7 3.68 
2013Q2 209,634 71.1 72.1 34.5 684.1 3.74  2013Q2 205,877 70.2 71.1 34.6 683.8 3.71 
2013Q3 203,099 73.6 74.4 34.9 683.7 4.00  2013Q3 202,897 73.5 74.2 35.5 682.9 4.18 
2013Q4 197,616 74.0 74.7 35.6 683.1 4.56  2013Q4 187,216 75.0 75.5 35.9 682.3 4.59 
2014Q1 198,813 74.0 74.7 35.8 682.8 4.61  2014Q1 195,766 74.0 74.5 36.3 682.3 4.58 
2014Q2 202,814 74.7 75.4 35.7 682.7 4.56  2014Q2 199,425 76.2 76.7 36.1 682.2 4.64 
2014Q3 210,565 76.9 77.4 35.8 682.9 4.54  2014Q3 206,086 75.9 76.3 36.2 681.9 4.53 
2014Q4 218,094 76.3 76.9 35.9 683.1 4.46  2014Q4 206,611 75.4 75.9 36.4 681.8 4.52 
2015Q1 217,193 75.5 76.1 35.8 683.1 4.33  2015Q1 217,495 74.5 75.1 36.2 682.5 4.31 
2015Q2 218,592 75.1 75.8 35.4 683.1 4.14  2015Q2 220,723 74.0 74.5 36.3 682.1 4.18 
2015Q3 218,322 76.1 76.9 35.5 683.2 4.24  2015Q3 217,755 75.2 75.7 36.2 682.3 4.33 
2015Q4 220,386 76.5 77.3 35.8 683.2 4.32  2015Q4 217,293 74.5 74.9 36.1 682.5 4.32 
2016Q1 225,479 75.3 76.1 35.9 682.9 4.29  2016Q1 224,991 73.9 74.4 36.4 682.6 4.29 
2016Q2 222,321 76.5 77.4 36.0 683.9 4.16  2016Q2 236,600 75.2 75.6 36.1 682.9 4.09 
2016Q3 217,409 76.4 77.4 35.9 683.9 4.02  2016Q3 231,651 73.4 73.8 36.0 682.6 3.97 
2016Q4 224,163 76.0 77.0 36.0 683.8 3.88  2016Q4 233,817 72.7 73.0 35.9 682.9 3.86 
2017Q1 214,916 75.1 76.3 36.6 683.1 4.16  2017Q1 219,249 73.1 73.4 36.3 682.6 4.29 
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Figure XV: Summary Statistics of FICO Scores: 700 – 740 
 Bank  Non-Bank 
 Average UBP LTV CLTV DTI FICO 
Note 
Rate 
  Average UBP LTV CLTV DTI FICO 
Note 
Rate 
2010Q1 224,904 68.0 69.2 36.0 721.4 4.95  2010Q1 212,957 67.4 68.9 36.6 721.8 4.96 
2010Q2 219,839 69.1 70.3 34.4 721.2 4.99  2010Q2 196,111 67.7 69.0 33.6 722.1 4.91 
2010Q3 228,941 69.8 70.8 33.9 721.3 4.79  2010Q3 215,754 69.8 71.0 34.2 721.7 4.79 
2010Q4 234,091 69.1 70.3 33.5 721.5 4.45  2010Q4 218,652 68.2 69.7 33.5 721.6 4.43 
2011Q1 227,714 69.5 71.1 33.8 721.7 4.48  2011Q1 207,903 68.3 70.2 33.6 721.7 4.48 
2011Q2 202,517 70.3 71.4 35.0 721.2 4.85  2011Q2 197,559 69.9 71.1 34.9 721.4 4.85 
2011Q3 219,227 73.3 74.3 34.6 721.2 4.60  2011Q3 206,352 71.4 72.3 34.8 721.5 4.56 
2011Q4 234,957 71.5 72.6 33.9 721.9 4.21  2011Q4 218,306 70.4 71.6 34.1 721.7 4.21 
2012Q1 222,533 71.5 72.8 34.0 721.8 4.12  2012Q1 208,967 69.7 71.0 33.9 721.7 4.08 
2012Q2 227,566 72.1 73.4 33.9 721.9 4.02  2012Q2 221,245 71.6 72.7 34.3 721.6 4.03 
2012Q3 234,311 72.2 73.4 33.6 722.0 3.81  2012Q3 228,246 72.4 73.4 34.0 722.0 3.80 
2012Q4 229,280 72.3 73.5 33.3 721.9 3.58  2012Q4 233,407 72.0 73.2 33.8 721.8 3.61 
2013Q1 239,106 71.3 72.7 33.4 722.0 3.50  2013Q1 239,086 71.7 73.0 33.8 722.0 3.56 
2013Q2 237,065 72.9 74.1 34.0 721.9 3.63  2013Q2 229,864 71.3 72.3 34.2 721.4 3.61 
2013Q3 223,176 74.7 75.6 34.4 721.4 3.88  2013Q3 225,005 75.5 76.4 35.0 721.2 4.08 
2013Q4 217,079 76.2 77.0 35.3 721.0 4.46  2013Q4 208,874 76.4 77.1 35.7 720.6 4.48 
2014Q1 212,382 75.9 76.7 35.6 720.8 4.49  2014Q1 215,733 75.5 76.2 36.0 720.5 4.48 
2014Q2 218,047 76.9 77.6 35.3 721.0 4.44  2014Q2 219,807 77.5 78.1 35.8 720.4 4.51 
2014Q3 226,274 78.5 79.2 35.3 720.8 4.38  2014Q3 226,897 77.4 78.0 35.8 720.4 4.40 
2014Q4 228,871 77.7 78.5 35.4 721.1 4.31  2014Q4 224,017 77.2 77.8 36.0 720.4 4.38 
2015Q1 235,881 76.5 77.3 35.3 721.1 4.16  2015Q1 239,538 76.0 76.6 35.6 720.9 4.17 
2015Q2 240,852 76.3 77.2 34.6 721.3 3.96  2015Q2 243,741 75.1 75.8 35.5 720.8 4.01 
2015Q3 230,576 77.6 78.5 35.1 721.3 4.08  2015Q3 233,105 77.4 78.1 35.6 720.6 4.21 
2015Q4 231,575 78.3 79.2 35.4 720.9 4.18  2015Q4 234,896 76.1 76.6 35.6 720.4 4.19 
2016Q1 239,404 76.4 77.3 35.4 720.7 4.13  2016Q1 240,245 75.2 75.8 35.6 720.5 4.16 
2016Q2 241,963 77.6 78.4 35.5 721.0 4.00  2016Q2 254,736 76.7 77.2 35.4 720.6 3.95 
2016Q3 237,511 77.3 78.2 35.4 721.0 3.83  2016Q3 253,368 74.8 75.3 35.0 720.7 3.81 
2016Q4 242,595 76.4 77.3 35.3 721.3 3.69  2016Q4 253,315 74.2 74.7 35.0 720.6 3.71 
2017Q1 233,044 75.7 76.8 36.0 720.9 3.99  2017Q1 235,982 75.2 75.7 35.7 720.4 4.19 
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Figure XVI: Summary Statistics of FICO Scores: 740 - 780 
 Bank  Non-Bank 
 Average UBP LTV CLTV DTI FICO 
Note 
Rate 
  Average UBP LTV CLTV DTI FICO 
Note 
Rate 
2010Q1 243,932 66.5 67.9 34.2 762.9 4.87  2010Q1 230,800 68.5 70.0 34.7 763.3 4.92 
2010Q2 239,039 68.4 69.6 32.9 763.0 4.92  2010Q2 215,453 70.2 71.5 32.7 762.8 4.92 
2010Q3 252,879 68.4 69.4 32.3 763.5 4.69  2010Q3 236,177 69.3 70.5 32.6 763.7 4.72 
2010Q4 254,612 67.6 69.0 31.9 763.8 4.36  2010Q4 236,665 66.8 68.4 31.8 763.9 4.34 
2011Q1 245,739 68.4 70.0 32.3 763.5 4.39  2011Q1 226,413 66.9 68.9 32.0 763.6 4.38 
2011Q2 217,006 69.7 70.9 33.6 763.1 4.78  2011Q2 213,050 69.2 70.4 33.8 763.1 4.78 
2011Q3 242,533 72.1 73.1 33.3 763.4 4.49  2011Q3 226,066 69.6 70.6 33.2 763.2 4.48 
2011Q4 260,588 70.0 71.2 32.3 764.0 4.10  2011Q4 240,367 68.8 70.2 32.3 763.6 4.10 
2012Q1 240,900 70.2 71.5 32.3 763.6 4.00  2012Q1 227,889 68.3 69.7 32.2 763.5 3.97 
2012Q2 242,443 71.0 72.3 32.4 763.5 3.92  2012Q2 236,559 69.8 71.0 32.5 763.5 3.92 
2012Q3 254,925 71.2 72.3 31.9 763.8 3.71  2012Q3 248,090 70.2 71.3 32.4 763.7 3.68 
2012Q4 249,349 71.1 72.2 31.7 763.7 3.48  2012Q4 254,219 70.1 71.2 32.0 763.7 3.51 
2013Q1 257,775 70.5 71.8 31.7 763.7 3.40  2013Q1 257,704 69.5 70.7 32.2 763.7 3.46 
2013Q2 250,323 72.3 73.4 32.6 763.2 3.56  2013Q2 244,138 69.2 70.3 32.6 763.4 3.48 
2013Q3 232,355 74.3 75.2 32.9 762.7 3.78  2013Q3 230,821 74.0 74.8 33.5 762.4 3.97 
2013Q4 225,446 75.8 76.6 34.1 762.4 4.37  2013Q4 219,544 75.2 75.9 34.1 762.1 4.37 
2014Q1 216,411 75.6 76.3 34.4 762.1 4.40  2014Q1 221,519 74.9 75.6 34.6 761.9 4.38 
2014Q2 222,125 76.8 77.4 34.1 762.3 4.37  2014Q2 229,066 76.6 77.3 34.6 761.9 4.39 
2014Q3 229,187 78.0 78.6 34.0 762.2 4.29  2014Q3 236,744 76.6 77.2 34.5 762.0 4.30 
2014Q4 232,892 77.0 77.7 34.0 762.1 4.22  2014Q4 236,008 76.8 77.4 34.8 761.8 4.27 
2015Q1 242,775 75.5 76.2 34.0 762.3 4.04  2015Q1 253,568 74.8 75.4 34.3 762.1 4.04 
2015Q2 250,120 75.5 76.4 33.4 762.4 3.86  2015Q2 254,656 73.7 74.4 34.2 762.2 3.89 
2015Q3 238,390 76.8 77.6 33.8 762.1 3.97  2015Q3 237,915 76.6 77.3 34.2 761.6 4.09 
2015Q4 236,019 77.6 78.3 34.0 761.9 4.06  2015Q4 238,584 75.5 76.0 34.3 761.7 4.08 
2016Q1 243,596 75.4 76.0 34.0 762.0 4.00  2016Q1 245,298 74.7 75.2 34.5 761.8 4.04 
2016Q2 250,570 76.2 76.8 34.1 762.1 3.85  2016Q2 262,382 75.9 76.4 34.1 762.0 3.82 
2016Q3 246,590 75.7 76.3 33.8 762.3 3.68  2016Q3 264,591 73.4 73.9 33.7 762.3 3.66 
2016Q4 253,380 74.5 75.1 33.6 762.2 3.54  2016Q4 261,877 72.7 73.2 33.5 762.2 3.58 
2017Q1 241,760 74.1 74.8 34.7 761.8 3.85  2017Q1 239,512 74.5 74.9 34.4 761.4 4.08 
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Figure XVII: Summary Statistics of FICO Scores: 780+ 
 Bank  Non-Bank 
 Average UBP LTV CLTV DTI FICO 
Note 
Rate 
  Average UBP LTV CLTV DTI FICO 
Note 
Rate 
2010Q1 234,681 62.3 63.5 31.5 796.6 4.82  2010Q1 226,207 64.5 65.9 31.2 797.4 4.86 
2010Q2 226,759 63.9 64.9 30.6 796.9 4.87  2010Q2 214,017 66.4 67.6 30.0 797.7 4.87 
2010Q3 242,687 63.3 64.1 29.8 797.7 4.59  2010Q3 229,740 64.4 65.5 29.7 798.3 4.63 
2010Q4 243,855 63.0 64.0 29.3 798.1 4.28  2010Q4 226,312 61.6 63.1 28.9 798.8 4.27 
2011Q1 233,293 63.9 65.1 29.9 797.6 4.32  2011Q1 214,654 61.5 63.2 29.2 798.2 4.27 
2011Q2 207,392 66.2 67.0 31.4 797.6 4.73  2011Q2 205,289 65.1 66.1 31.2 798.0 4.71 
2011Q3 234,003 67.4 68.2 30.9 797.7 4.38  2011Q3 220,137 64.9 65.8 30.7 798.1 4.36 
2011Q4 257,182 64.9 65.9 29.7 798.4 4.00  2011Q4 232,623 63.7 64.7 29.5 798.5 3.99 
2012Q1 238,422 64.9 66.0 29.6 798.5 3.91  2012Q1 226,657 62.7 63.7 29.4 798.5 3.86 
2012Q2 238,942 65.7 66.6 29.7 798.7 3.83  2012Q2 231,618 64.4 65.2 30.1 798.8 3.82 
2012Q3 251,935 66.3 67.1 29.3 798.3 3.62  2012Q3 244,475 64.7 65.5 29.7 798.3 3.58 
2012Q4 243,839 66.1 66.9 29.0 798.3 3.40  2012Q4 251,114 64.5 65.4 29.4 798.3 3.41 
2013Q1 252,648 65.6 66.5 29.0 798.1 3.32  2013Q1 251,707 63.9 64.8 29.6 798.4 3.37 
2013Q2 244,041 67.2 68.0 30.1 798.1 3.49  2013Q2 237,740 63.3 64.2 29.6 798.7 3.35 
2013Q3 227,176 69.0 69.7 30.4 798.0 3.67  2013Q3 230,728 69.0 69.6 31.0 797.6 3.86 
2013Q4 219,452 71.4 72.0 31.8 797.2 4.30  2013Q4 216,541 70.3 70.9 31.6 797.3 4.26 
2014Q1 210,271 70.8 71.4 32.0 797.4 4.30  2014Q1 219,916 70.3 70.8 32.3 797.0 4.27 
2014Q2 219,109 72.3 72.9 31.8 797.6 4.28  2014Q2 226,676 72.1 72.6 32.1 797.5 4.29 
2014Q3 224,341 73.2 73.7 31.8 797.7 4.19  2014Q3 233,811 72.4 72.9 32.1 797.5 4.19 
2014Q4 228,093 72.4 72.9 31.7 797.8 4.13  2014Q4 235,096 72.4 72.8 32.2 797.4 4.18 
2015Q1 238,410 70.6 71.1 31.5 797.8 3.93  2015Q1 255,012 70.2 70.6 31.7 797.4 3.93 
2015Q2 243,966 70.4 71.0 30.9 798.1 3.77  2015Q2 252,876 68.6 69.1 31.7 798.1 3.78 
2015Q3 234,519 71.6 72.1 31.4 798.0 3.88  2015Q3 234,469 72.2 72.7 31.9 797.7 4.01 
2015Q4 231,899 72.5 73.0 31.6 797.7 3.96  2015Q4 237,838 71.1 71.5 32.0 797.5 3.98 
2016Q1 240,172 70.3 70.8 31.6 797.9 3.91  2016Q1 245,137 70.1 70.5 32.0 797.5 3.93 
2016Q2 248,052 70.9 71.3 31.7 797.9 3.75  2016Q2 260,805 70.7 71.0 31.7 797.9 3.70 
2016Q3 245,923 69.9 70.3 31.2 798.3 3.57  2016Q3 263,463 67.6 68.0 31.0 798.1 3.54 
2016Q4 252,353 68.3 68.7 30.9 798.4 3.44  2016Q4 261,402 66.8 67.2 30.9 798.2 3.47 
2017Q1 240,767 68.4 69.0 32.2 797.9 3.74  2017Q1 235,281 70.1 70.5 32.2 797.4 3.98 
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Figure XVIII: Summary Statistics of Loan Quality in Stress Scenarios – FICO: Below 620  
Note Rate Average UPB DTI LTV CLTV  
Bank Non-Bank Bank 
Non-
Bank Bank 
Non-
Bank Bank 
Non-
Bank Bank 
Non-
Bank 
100 bps 10.7%  12.2%  (11.3%) (14.7%) 0.9%  (0.2%) (3.7%) (1.6%) (4.0%) (0.8%) 
50 bps 5.4%  6.1%  (5.7%) (7.3%) 0.4%  (0.1%) (1.8%) (0.8%) (2.0%) (0.4%) 
25 bps 2.7%  3.0%  (2.8%) (3.7%) 0.2%  (0.1%) (0.9%) (0.4%) (1.0%) (0.2%) 
-25 bps (2.7%) (3.0%) 2.8%  3.7%  (0.2%) 0.1%  0.9%  0.4%  1.0%  0.2%  
-50 bps (5.4%) (6.1%) 5.7%  7.3%  (0.4%) 0.1%  1.8%  0.8%  2.0%  0.4%  
-100 bps (10.7%) (12.2%) 11.3%  14.7%  (0.9%) 0.2%  3.7%  1.6%  4.0%  0.8%  
 
Figure XIX: Summary Statistics of Loan Quality in Stress Scenarios – FICO: 620 – 660   
Interest Rate Average UPB DTI LTV CLTV 
 Bank Non-Bank Bank 
Non-
Bank Bank 
Non-
Bank Bank 
Non-
Bank Bank 
Non-
Bank 
100 bps 10.5%  11.5%  (7.2%) (11.9%) 1.0%  1.2%  (4.6%) (2.2%) (4.5%) (2.0%) 
50 bps 5.2%  5.8%  (3.6%) (6.0%) 0.5%  0.6%  (2.3%) (1.1%) (2.3%) (1.0%) 
25 bps 2.6%  2.9%  (1.8%) (3.0%) 0.3%  0.3%  (1.1%) (0.6%) (1.1%) (0.5%) 
-25 bps (2.6%) (2.9%) 1.8%  3.0%  (0.3%) (0.3%) 1.1%  0.6%  1.1%  0.5%  
-50 bps (5.2%) (5.8%) 3.6%  6.0%  (0.5%) (0.6%) 2.3%  1.1%  2.3%  1.0%  
-100 bps (10.5%) (11.5%) 7.2%  11.9%  (1.0%) (1.2%) 4.6%  2.2%  4.5%  2.0%  
 
Figure XX: Summary Statistics of Loan Quality in Stress Scenarios – FICO: 620 – 660   
Interest Rate Average UPB DTI LTV CLTV 
 Bank Non-Bank Bank 
Non-
Bank Bank 
Non-
Bank Bank 
Non-
Bank Bank 
Non-
Bank 
100 bps 11.3%  11.8%  (5.2%) (9.1%) 1.0%  0.1%  (4.1%) (3.2%) (4.0%) (2.9%) 
50 bps 5.6%  5.9%  (2.6%) (4.6%) 0.5%  0.1%  (2.0%) (1.6%) (2.0%) (1.5%) 
25 bps 2.8%  2.9%  (1.3%) (2.3%) 0.2%  0.0%  (1.0%) (0.8%) (1.0%) (0.7%) 
-25 bps (2.8%) (2.9%) 1.3%  2.3%  (0.2%) (0.0%) 1.0%  0.8%  1.0%  0.7%  
-50 bps (5.6%) (5.9%) 2.6%  4.6%  (0.5%) (0.1%) 2.0%  1.6%  2.0%  1.5%  
-100 bps (11.3%) (11.8%) 5.2%  9.1%  (1.0%) (0.1%) 4.1%  3.2%  4.0%  2.9%  
 
 
Figure XXI: Summary Statistics of Loan Quality in Stress Scenarios – FICO: 660 – 700   
Interest Rate Average UPB DTI LTV CLTV 
 Bank Non-Bank Bank 
Non-
Bank Bank 
Non-
Bank Bank 
Non-
Bank Bank 
Non-
Bank 
100 bps 12.1%  12.1%  (3.8%) (7.7%) 0.8%  0.4%  (3.4%) (3.2%) (3.3%) (2.8%) 
50 bps 6.1%  6.1%  (1.9%) (3.8%) 0.4%  0.2%  (1.7%) (1.6%) (1.6%) (1.4%) 
25 bps 3.0%  3.0%  (1.0%) (1.9%) 0.2%  0.1%  (0.9%) (0.8%) (0.8%) (0.7%) 
-25 bps (3.0%) (3.0%) 1.0%  1.9%  (0.2%) (0.1%) 0.9%  0.8%  0.8%  0.7%  
-50 bps (6.1%) (6.1%) 1.9%  3.8%  (0.4%) (0.2%) 1.7%  1.6%  1.6%  1.4%  
-100 bps (12.1%) (12.1%) 3.8%  7.7%  (0.8%) (0.4%) 3.4%  3.2%  3.3%  2.8%  
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Figure XXII: Summary Statistics of Loan Quality in Stress Scenarios – FICO: 700 – 740   
Interest Rate Average UPB DTI LTV CLTV 
 Bank Non-Bank Bank 
Non-
Bank Bank 
Non-
Bank Bank 
Non-
Bank Bank 
Non-
Bank 
100 bps 13.0%  13.3%  (3.1%) (6.9%) 0.8%  0.6%  (3.3%) (1.9%) (3.0%) (1.4%) 
50 bps 6.5%  6.7%  (1.6%) (3.5%) 0.4%  0.3%  (1.7%) (0.9%) (1.5%) (0.7%) 
25 bps 3.3%  3.3%  (0.8%) (1.7%) 0.2%  0.1%  (0.8%) (0.5%) (0.8%) (0.4%) 
-25 bps (3.3%) (3.3%) 0.8%  1.7%  (0.2%) (0.1%) 0.8%  0.5%  0.8%  0.4%  
-50 bps (6.5%) (6.7%) 1.6%  3.5%  (0.4%) (0.3%) 1.7%  0.9%  1.5%  0.7%  
-100 bps (13.0%) (13.3%) 3.1%  6.9%  (0.8%) (0.6%) 3.3%  1.9%  3.0%  1.4%  
 
 
Figure XXIII: Summary Statistics of Loan Quality in Stress Scenarios – FICO: 780+  
Interest Rate Average UPB DTI LTV CLTV 
 Bank Non-Bank Bank 
Non-
Bank Bank 
Non-
Bank Bank 
Non-
Bank Bank 
Non-
Bank 
100 bps 13.8%  14.1%  (5.3%) (7.9%) 1.2%  0.0%  (2.8%) (1.2%) (2.5%) (0.7%) 
50 bps 6.9%  7.0%  (2.6%) (3.9%) 0.6%  0.0%  (1.4%) (0.6%) (1.3%) (0.3%) 
25 bps 3.4%  3.5%  (1.3%) (2.0%) 0.3%  0.0%  (0.7%) (0.3%) (0.6%) (0.2%) 
-25 bps 0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  
-50 bps (3.4%) (3.5%) 1.3%  2.0%  (0.3%) (0.0%) 0.7%  0.3%  0.6%  0.2%  
-100 bps (6.9%) (7.0%) 2.6%  3.9%  (0.6%) (0.0%) 1.4%  0.6%  1.3%  0.3%  
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Figure XXV: Summary Statistics on Note Rate Regression 
Banks FICO: Below 620 
  Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -1.7994 0.9248 -1.946 0.06216 . 
Slope 0.9158 0.204 4.489 0.00012 *** 
RMSE 0.4281  F-statistic 20.15  
R-Squared 0.4274  P-Value 0.00012  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Non-Bank FICO: Below 620 
 Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -2.1509 0.7757 -2.773 0.00995 ** 
Slope 0.9952 0.1713 5.809 3.51E-06 *** 
RMSE 0.4281  F-statistic 20.15  
R-Squared 0.4274  P-Value 0.00012  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Banks FICO: 620 – 660  
  Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -2.2017 0.9398 -2.343 0.0268 * 
Slope 1.0139 0.2092 4.846 4.61E-05 *** 
RMSE 20.15  F-statistic 23.48  
R-Squared 0.00012  P-Value 4.61E-05  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Non-Bank FICO: 620 – 660 
 Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -2.3814 0.8239 -2.89 0.00751 ** 
Slope 1.0556 0.1837 5.748 4.13E-06 *** 
RMSE 0.3794  F-statistic 33.03  
R-Squared 0.5503  P-Value 4.13E-06  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Figure XXV: Summary Statistics on Note Rate Regression 
Banks FICO: 660 – 700 
  Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -2.0648   0.8544  -2.417   0.0227 *   
Slope 1.0133   0.1959   5.172 1.92E-05 *** 
RMSE 0.401  F-statistic 26.75  
R-Squared 0.4976  P-Value 1.92E-05  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Non-Bank FICO: 660 – 700 
 Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -2.2314   0.8062  -2.768   0.0101 *   
Slope 1.0475   0.1841   5.688 4.83E-06 *** 
RMSE 0.3816  F-statistic 32.36  
R-Squared 0.5451  P-Value 4.83E-06  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Banks FICO: 700 – 740  
  Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -1.8104 0.7813 -2.317 0.0283 * 
Slope 0.9862 0.185 5.332 1.25E-05 *** 
RMSE 0.3949  F-statistic 28.43  
R-Squared 0.5129  P-Value 1.25E-05  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Non-Bank FICO: 700 – 740 
 Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -2.1659 0.7782 -2.783 0.00971 ** 
Slope 1.065 0.1833 5.81 3.5E-06 *** 
RMSE 0.3772  F-statistic 33.75  
R-Squared 0.5556  P-Value 3.5E-06  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Figure XXV: Summary Statistics on Note Rate Regression 
Banks FICO: 740 – 780  
  Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -1.6446 0.7313 -2.249 0.0329 * 
Slope 0.9707 0.1774 5.472 8.6E-06 *** 
RMSE 0.3896  F-statistic 29.94  
R-Squared 0.5258  P-Value 8.6E-06  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Non-Bank FICO: 740 – 780 
 Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -1.8589 0.7087 -2.623 0.0142 * 
Slope 1.0172 0.171 5.949 2.42E-06 *** 
RMSE 0.3722  F-statistic 35.39  
R-Squared 0.5672  P-Value 2.42E-06  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Banks FICO: 780+ 
  Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -1.5278 0.6942 -2.201 0.0365 * 
Slope 0.9631 0.1721 5.597 6.16E-06 *** 
RMSE 0.3849  F-statistic 31.33  
R-Squared 0.5371  P-Value 6.16E-06  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Non-Bank FICO: 780+ 
 Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -1.6624 0.6695 -2.483 0.0195 * 
Slope 0.9936 0.1655 6.005 2.09E-06 *** 
RMSE 0.3702  F-statistic 36.06  
R-Squared 0.5718  P-Value 2.09E-06  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Figure XXVI: Summary Statistics on Average Unpaid Balance Regression 
Banks FICO: Below 620 
  Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) 4.891e+00 7.826e-01 6.249 1.1e-06 *** 
Slope -1.364e-05 4.154e-06 -3.284 0.00283 ** 
RMSE 0.4782  F-statistic 10.79  
R-Squared 0.2854  P-Value 0.002832  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Non-Bank FICO: Below 620 
 Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -1.7994 0.9248 -1.946 0.06216 . 
Slope 0.9158 0.2040 4.489 0.00012 *** 
RMSE 0.4281  F-statistic 20.15  
R-Squared 0.4274  P-Value 0.00012  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Banks FICO: 620 – 660  
  Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept)   5.179e+00 1.017e 5.092 2.38e-05 *** 
Slope -1.566e-05   5.581e-06   -2.806 0.00919 ** 
RMSE 0.4978  F-statistic 7.873  
R-Squared 0.2258  P-Value 0.009193  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Non-Bank FICO: 620 – 660 
 Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -2.2017 0.9398 -2.343 0.0268 * 
Slope 1.0139 0.2092 4.846 4.61e-05 *** 
RMSE 0.4138  F-statistic 23.48  
R-Squared 0.4651  P-Value 4.612e-05  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Figure XXVI: Summary Statistics on Average Unpaid Balance Regression 
Banks FICO: 660 – 700 
  Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) 6.447e 1.509e 4.273 0.000214 *** 
Slope -2.001e-05   7.333e-06 -2.729 0.011034 * 
RMSE 0.5009  F-statistic 7.449  
R-Squared 0.2162  P-Value 0.01103  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Non-Bank FICO: 660 – 700 
 Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) 5.483e 9.642e-01    5.686 4.85e-06 ***  
Slope -1.555e-05   4.747e-06 -3.277 0.00289 ** 
RMSE 0.4786  F-statistic 10.74  
R-Squared 0.2845  P-Value 0.002886  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Banks FICO: 700 – 740  
  Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) 8.770e 2.263e 3.876 0.000614 *** 
Slope -2.809e-05 9.873e-06 -2.845 0.008364 ** 
RMSE 0.4962  F-statistic 8.096  
R-Squared 0.2307  P-Value 0.008364  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Non-Bank FICO: 700 – 740 
 Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -1.8104 0.7813 -2.317 0.0283 * 
Slope 0.9862 0.1850 5.332 1.25e-05 *** 
RMSE 0.3949  F-statistic 28.43  
R-Squared 0.5129  P-Value 1.25e-05  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Figure XXVI: Summary Statistics on Average Unpaid Balance Regression 
Banks FICO: 740 – 780  
  Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) 6.074e 2.096e 2.898 0.00737 ** 
Slope -1.545e-05 8.657e-06 -1.785 0.08549  
RMSE 0.5351  F-statistic 3.187  
R-Squared 0.1056  P-Value 0.08549  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Non-Bank FICO: 740 – 780 
 Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -1.6446 0.7313 -2.249 0.0329 * 
Slope 0.9707 0.1774 5.472 8.6e-06 *** 
RMSE 0.3896  F-statistic 29.94  
R-Squared 0.5258  P-Value 8.603e-06  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Banks FICO: 780+ 
  Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) 7.597e 1.779e 4.271 0.000215 *** 
Slope -2.226e-05 7.516e-06 -2.961 0.006317 ** 
RMSE 0.4915  F-statistic 8.769  
R-Squared 0.2452  P-Value 0.006317  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Non-Bank FICO: 780+ 
 Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -1.5278 0.6942 -2.201 0.0365 * 
Slope 0.9631 0.1721 5.597 6.16e-06 *** 
RMSE 0.3849  F-statistic 31.33  
R-Squared 0.5371  P-Value 6.156e-06  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Figure XXVII: Summary Statistics on Debt – To – Income Regression 
Banks FICO: Below 620 
  Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) 0.68795 2.61795 0.263 0.795 . 
Slope 0.04617 0.07325 0.630 0.534 *** 
RMSE 0.5616  F-statistic 0.3974  
R-Squared 0.0145  P-Value 0.5338  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Non-Bank FICO: Below 620 
 Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) 2.613945 2.033631 1.285 0.210 ** 
Slope -0.007814 0.057279 -0.136 0.893 *** 
RMSE 0.5656  F-statistic 0.01861  
R-Squared 0.0006888  P-Value 0.8925  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Banks FICO: 620 – 660  
  Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -4.9406 4.8808 -1.012 0.320 * 
Slope 0.2057 0.1379 1.491 0.147 *** 
RMSE 0.5438  F-statistic 2.224  
R-Squared 0.07611  P-Value 0.1475  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Non-Bank FICO: 620 – 660 
 Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -5.1240 4.4931 -1.140 0.264 ** 
Slope 0.2088 0.1257 1.661 0.108 *** 
RMSE 0.5389  F-statistic 2.759  
R-Squared 0.0927  P-Value 0.1083  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Figure XXVII: Summary Statistics on Debt – To – Income Regression 
Banks FICO: 660 – 700 
  Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -3.5988 4.6649 -0.771 0.447 *   
Slope 0.1682 0.1321 1.273 0.214 *** 
RMSE 0.5495  F-statistic 1.62  
R-Squared 0.0566  P-Value 0.214  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Non-Bank FICO: 660 – 700 
 Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) 1.54327 4.44947 0.347 0.731 *   
Slope 0.02234 0.12519 0.178 0.860 *** 
RMSE 0.5654  F-statistic 0.03183  
R-Squared 0.001178  P-Value 0.8597  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Banks FICO: 700 – 740  
  Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -1.8615 4.4223 -0.421 0.677 * 
Slope 0.1210 0.1274 0.950 0.351 *** 
RMSE 0.5565  F-statistic 0.9018  
R-Squared 0.03232  P-Value 0.3507  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Non-Bank FICO: 700 – 740 
 Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) 0.56946 4.15398 0.137 0.892 ** 
Slope 0.05062 0.11892 0.426 0.674 *** 
RMSE 0.5639  F-statistic 0.1811  
R-Squared 0.006664  P-Value 0.6738  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Figure XXVII: Summary Statistics on Debt – To – Income Regression 
Banks FICO: 740 – 780  
  Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -1.1320 3.8427 -0.295 0.771 * 
Slope 0.1043 0.1155 0.903 0.374 *** 
RMSE 0.5574  F-statistic 0.8155  
R-Squared 0.02932  P-Value 0.3745  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Non-Bank FICO: 740 – 780 
 Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) 0.31538 3.57592 0.088 0.930 * 
Slope 0.06041 0.10682 0.566 0.576 *** 
RMSE 0.5624  F-statistic 0.3199  
R-Squared 0.01171  P-Value 0.5764  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Banks FICO: 780+ 
  Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -1.0621 3.1980 -0.332 0.742 * 
Slope 0.1105 0.1039 1.063 0.297 *** 
RMSE 0.5543  F-statistic 1.131  
R-Squared 0.0402  P-Value 0.297  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Non-Bank FICO: 780+ 
 Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) 2.250979 2.953702 0.762 0.453 * 
Slope 0.002786 0.095701 0.029 0.977 *** 
RMSE 0.5657  F-statistic 0.0008472  
R-Squared 3.138e-05  P-Value 0.977  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Figure XXVIII: Summary Statistics on LTV Regression 
Banks FICO: Below 620 
  Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) 6.00464 1.79509 3.345 0.00243 . 
Slope -0.05187 0.02535 -2.046 0.05058 *** 
RMSE 0.5264  F-statistic 4.187  
R-Squared 0.1343  P-Value 0.05058  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Non-Bank FICO: Below 620 
 Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) 3.74674 1.78556 2.098 0.0454 ** 
Slope -0.02074 0.02623 -0.791 0.4359 *** 
RMSE 0.5593  F-statistic 0.6256  
R-Squared 0.02264  P-Value 0.4359  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Banks FICO: 620 – 660  
  Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) 7.73965 1.81773 4.258 0.000223 * 
Slope -0.07735 0.02599 -2.976 0.006094 *** 
RMSE 0.4909  F-statistic 8.857  
R-Squared 0.247  P-Value 0.006094  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Non-Bank FICO: 620 – 660 
 Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) 8.75477 3.01477 2.904 0.00726 ** 
Slope -0.09441 0.04432 -2.130 0.04244 *** 
RMSE 0.5235  F-statistic 4.537  
R-Squared 0.1439  P-Value 0.04244  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Figure XXVIII: Summary Statistics on LTV Regression 
Banks FICO: 660 – 700 
  Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) 7.82026 1.96878 3.972 0.000476 *   
Slope -0.07568 0.02714 -2.788 0.009590 *** 
RMSE 0.4985  F-statistic 7.774  
R-Squared 0.2236  P-Value 0.00959  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Non-Bank FICO: 660 – 700 
 Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) 7.52864 2.22763 3.380 0.00222 *   
Slope -0.07235 0.03101 -2.333 0.02736 *** 
RMSE 0.5161  F-statistic 5.442  
R-Squared 0.1677  P-Value 0.02736  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Banks FICO: 700 – 740  
  Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) 7.74811 2.18624 3.544 0.00146 * 
Slope -0.07316 0.02953 -2.477 0.01978 *** 
RMSE 0.5107  F-statistic 6.138  
R-Squared 0.1852  P-Value 0.01978  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Non-Bank FICO: 700 – 740 
 Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) 7.27135 2.18410 3.329 0.00253 ** 
Slope -0.06743 0.02982 -2.261 0.03199 *** 
RMSE 0.5188  F-statistic 5.114  
R-Squared 0.1593  P-Value 0.03199  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Figure XXVIII: Summary Statistics on LTV Regression 
Banks FICO: 740 – 780  
  Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) 6.97571 2.10573 3.313 0.00263 * 
Slope -0.06357 0.02883 -2.205 0.03613 *** 
RMSE 0.5208  F-statistic 4.863  
R-Squared 0.1526  P-Value 0.03613  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Non-Bank FICO: 740 – 780 
 Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) 5.10872 2.29062 2.230 0.0342 * 
Slope -0.03842 0.03171 -1.211 0.2363 *** 
RMSE 0.551  F-statistic 1.467  
R-Squared 0.05154  P-Value 0.2363  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Banks FICO: 780+ 
  Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) 6.06788 2.09308 2.899 0.00735 * 
Slope -0.05485 0.03074 -1.785 0.08558 *** 
RMSE 0.5351  F-statistic 3.185  
R-Squared 0.1055  P-Value 0.08558  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Non-Bank FICO: 780+ 
 Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) 3.68586 2.01866 1.826 0.0789 * 
Slope -0.02007 0.02999 -0.669 0.5091 *** 
RMSE 0.5611  F-statistic 0.4477  
R-Squared 0.01631  P-Value 0.5091  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Figure XXIX: Summary Statistics on CLTV Regression 
Banks FICO: Below 620 
  Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -1.7994 0.9248 -1.946 0.06216 . 
Slope 0.9158 0.204 4.489 0.00012 *** 
RMSE 0.4281  F-statistic 20.15  
R-Squared 0.4274  P-Value 0.00012  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Non-Bank FICO: Below 620 
 Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -2.1509 0.7757 -2.773 0.00995 ** 
Slope 0.9952 0.1713 5.809 3.51E-06 *** 
RMSE 0.5644  F-statistic 0.1264  
R-Squared 0.00466  P-Value 0.7249  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Banks FICO: 620 – 660  
  Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -2.2017 0.9398 -2.343 0.0268 * 
Slope 1.0139 0.2092 4.846 4.61E-05 *** 
RMSE 0.4138  F-statistic 23.48  
R-Squared 0.4651  P-Value 4.61E-05  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Non-Bank FICO: 620 – 660 
 Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -2.3814 0.8239 -2.89 0.00751 ** 
Slope 1.0556 0.1837 5.748 4.13E-06 *** 
RMSE 0.5253  F-statistic 4.317  
R-Squared 0.1379  P-Value 0.04736  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Figure XXIX: Summary Statistics on CLTV Regression 
Banks FICO: 660 – 700 
  Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -2.0648   0.8544  -2.417   0.0227 *   
Slope 1.0133   0.1959   5.172 1.92E-05 *** 
RMSE 0.4966  F-statistic 8.048  
R-Squared 0.2296  P-Value 0.008537  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Non-Bank FICO: 660 – 700 
 Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -2.2314   0.8062  -2.768   0.0101 *   
Slope 1.0475   0.1841   5.688 4.83E-06 *** 
RMSE 0.5165  F-statistic 5.4  
R-Squared 0.1667  P-Value 0.0279  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Banks FICO: 700 – 740  
  Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -1.8104 0.7813 -2.317 0.0283 * 
Slope 0.9862 0.185 5.332 1.25E-05 *** 
RMSE 0.3949  F-statistic 28.43  
R-Squared 0.5129  P-Value 1.25E-05  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Non-Bank FICO: 700 – 740 
 Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -2.1659 0.7782 -2.783 0.00971 ** 
Slope 1.065 0.1833 5.81 3.5E-06 *** 
RMSE 0.5215  F-statistic 4.78  
R-Squared 0.1504  P-Value 0.03764  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Figure XXIX: Summary Statistics on CLTV Regression 
Banks FICO: 740 – 780  
  Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -1.6446 0.7313 -2.249 0.0329 * 
Slope 0.9707 0.1774 5.472 8.6E-06 *** 
RMSE 0.3896  F-statistic 29.94  
R-Squared 0.5258  P-Value 8.6E-06  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Non-Bank FICO: 740 – 780 
 Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -1.8589 0.7087 -2.623 0.0142 * 
Slope 1.0172 0.171 5.949 2.42E-06 *** 
RMSE 0.5547  F-statistic 1.088  
R-Squared 0.03872  P-Value 0.3062  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Banks FICO: 780+ 
  Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -1.5278 0.6942 -2.201 0.0365 * 
Slope 0.9631 0.1721 5.597 6.16E-06 *** 
RMSE 0.3849  F-statistic 31.33  
R-Squared 0.5371  P-Value 6.16E-06  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Non-Bank FICO: 780+ 
 Estimate Std. Error T-Value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -1.6624 0.6695 -2.483 0.0195 * 
Slope 0.9936 0.1655 6.005 2.09E-06 *** 
RMSE 0.5639  F-statistic 0.1749  
R-Squared 0.006436  P-Value 0.6791  
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Figure XXX: Classification of Banks and Shadow Banks 
Banks Shadow Banks 
Ally Bank  
Bank of America  
BOK Financial  
Branch Banking and Trust Company  
Capital One  
Citibank  
Citimortgage  
Colorado FSB  
Everbank  
FHLB Chicago  
Fidelity Bank  
Fifth Third Mortgage  
First Republic Bank  
Flagstar Bank FSB  
Fremont Bank  
Homestreet Bank  
HSBC Bank  
JPMorgan Chase  
MB Bank  
Metlife Home Loans  
Mortgage Stanley Private Bank  
MUFG Bank  
Navy FCU  
NY Community Bank  
PNC Bank  
Redwood Credit Union  
Regions Bank  
Union Savings Bank  
US Bank  
USAA FSB  
Wells Fargo Bank  
Amerisave Mortgage  
Cashcall Inc  
Guaranteed Rate Inc  
Homeward Residential  
Movement Mortgage  
Quicken Loans  
Academy Mortgage  
AmCap Mortgage LTD  
American Neighborhood Mtg  
American Pacific Mortgage  
Amerifirst Financial Corp  
Amerihome Mortgage  
Ark-LA-TEX Fin Svcs.  
Bay Equity Shadow  
Broker Solutions  
Caliber Home Loans  
Chicago Mortgage Solutions  
CMG Mortgage  
Ditech Financial  
Fairway Independent Mortgage  
Franklin American Mortgage  
Freedom Mortgage  
Greenlight Financial  
Guild Mortgage  
Homebridge Financial Services  
Impact Mortgage  
LoanDepot.com  
Mortgage Research Center  
Nationstart Mortgage  
Newday Financial  
Pacific Union Financial  
PennyMac Loan Services  
PHH Mortgage  
Plaza Home Mortgage  
Primary Residential Mortgage Inc. 
PrimeLending  
Primelending Plainscapital  
Prospect Mortgage  
Provident Funding  
Sierra Pacific Mortgage  
Sovereign Lending Group  
Stearns Lending  
Stonegate Mortgage  
Suntrust Mortgage  
Sunwest Mortgage  
Walker and Dunlop 
 
